Over the past two decades, rational choice theories have made rapid inroads into the study of EU politics. This paper examines the application of rational choice analyses to EU politics, assesses the empirical fruitfulness of such analyses, and identifies both internal and external challenges to the rational choice study of the EU. With regard to the empirical fruitfulness of rational choice, the paper notes charges of methodological 'pathologies' in rational choice work, but suggests that rational choice approaches have produced productive research programs and shed light on concrete empirical cases including the legislative, executive and judicial politics of the EU, as well as on other questions such as public opinion and Europeanization. Turning to external critiques, the paper examines claims that rational choice is 'ontologically blind' to certain phenomena such as endogenous preference formation and sources of change. While rational choice as a research program does focus scholars attention on certain types of questions, rational choice scholars have theorized explicitly, alongside scholars from other theoretical traditions, about both national preference formation and about endogenous source of change, thereby clarifying and advancing the study of both phenomena.
recent analyses, that the rationalist-constructivist debate in EU studies has largely been a useful and pragmatic one, which has forced rationalists to confront difficult issues like endogenous preference formation and sources of change. A brief fifth section concludes.
[1] Rational Choice as a Second-Order (Meta-)Theory Rational choice is, in Alexander Wendt's terms, a 'second-order' theory, concerned with ontological and epistemological questions such as 'the nature of human agency and its relationship to social structures, the role of ideas and material forces in social life, the proper form of social explanations and so on'.
2 By contrast with such broad, second-order social theories, 'first-order' theories are 'substantive', 'domain-specific' theories about particular social systems such as the family, Congress, the international system, or the EU. Such first-order theories are derived from and should be consistent with the broader second-order theories to which they belong, but they go beyond second-order theories in identifying particular social systems as the object of study, in making specific assumptions about those systems and their constituent actors, and in making specific causal or interpretive claims about them (Wendt 1999: 6; Snidal 2002: 74-5) .
As a second-order theory, the rational choice approach relies on several fundamental assumptions about the nature of individual actors and of the social world that they constitute. At this broadest level, rational choice is 'a methodological approach that explains both individual and collective (social) outcomes in terms of individual goal-seeking under constraints…' (Snidal, 2002: 74) . This formulation, in turn, contains three essential elements: (1) methodological individualism, (2) goalseeking or utility-maximization, and (3) the existence of various institutional or strategic constraints on individual choice.
The first of these elements, methodological individualism, means simply that rational choice analyses treat individuals as the basic units of social analysis. By contrast with 'holist' approaches that treat society as basic and derive individual characteristics from society, rational choice approaches seek to explain both individual and collective behavior as the aggregation of individual choices.
Individuals, in this view, act according to preferences that are assumed to be fixed, transitive, and exogenously given.
Second, individuals are assumed to act so as maximize their expected utility, subject to constraints. That is to say, individuals with fixed preferences over possible states of the world calculate the expected utility of alternative courses of action, and choose the action that is likely to maximize their utility. This 'logic of consequentiality' provides a distinctive approach to human action and stands in contrast to both the 'logic of appropriateness', in which action is guided by the aim of behaving in conformity with accepted social norms, and the 'logic of arguing', where actors engage in truth-seeking deliberation, accepting 'the power of the better argument' rather than calculating the utility of alternative courses of action for themselves (Risse, 2000) . Rational choice, at this broad, second-order level of analysis, is not a theory of EU politics, or even of politics more generally, but an umbrella for a family of firstorder theories that marry these basic assumptions to an additional set of substantive assumptions about, inter alia, the nature of the actors, their preferences, and the institutional or strategic settings in which they interact. Rational choice approaches can, for example, take individuals, organizations, or states as their basic unit of analysis. They can adopt a 'thick' conception of rationality, in which actors are assumed to be narrowly self-interested, or a 'thin' conception in which rational-actors make may be self-interested or altruistic and may seek a variety of goals such as wealth, power, or even love (Ferejohn, 1991) . Rational choice models can also differ in terms of their assumptions about individual preferences, the institutional and strategic situations in which individuals interact, and the quality of the information available to actors seeking to maximize their individual utility. Many rational choice theories -including an increasing number in EU studies -are formulated as formal models, which express theoretical models in mathematic terms. 4 In many other cases, however, theories with rationalist assumptions are formulated and expressed verbally, with little or no use of formal modeling, i.e., 'soft' rational choice.
Given the very basic second-order assumptions laid out above, and the considerable variation within rational choice in terms of substantive assumption, we should understand rational choice, not as a single theory, but as a family of first-order theories connected by common assumptions and methodology. For this reason, as Wendt (1999) and Checkel (this volume) point out with regard to constructivism, rational choice as a second-order theory cannot be either supported or falsified by empirical evidence. It is, rather, the first-order or mid-range theories of politics derived from rational choice that do -or do not -provide testable hypotheses and insights into the politics of various political systems, including the European Union.
[1.1] Rational Choice Institutionalism
Over the past two decades, perhaps the leading strand of rational choice literature -and certainly the most influential in EU studies -has been that of rational choice institutionalism, in which formal and (to a lesser extent) informal institutions have been reintroduced to the rational choice study of American, comparative, and international politics. The contemporary RCI literature can be traced to the effort by American political scientists in the 1970s to re-introduce institutional factors, such as the workings of the committee system, into formal models of majority voting in the US Congress. Such scholars number examined in detail the 'agenda-setting' powers of the Congressional committees, specifying the conditions under which agendasetting committees could influence the outcomes of certain Congressional votes.
Congressional scholars also developed principal-agent models of legislative delegation of authority to the executive, to independent regulatory agencies, and to courts, analyzing the independence of these various 'agents' and the efforts of Congressional 'principals' to control them. More recently, Epstein and O'Halloran (1999) and Huber and Shipan (2003) have pioneered a 'transaction-cost' approach to the design of political institutions, hypothesizing that legislators deliberately and systematically design political institutions to minimize the transaction costs associated with making public policy. Throughout this work, rational choice theorists have studied institutions both as independent variables that channel individual choices into 'institutional equilibria', and as dependent variables, or 'equilibrium institutions', chosen or designed by actors to secure mutual gains.
Although originally formulated in the context of American political institutions, these models are applicable across a range of other comparative and international political contexts. In recent years, for example, comparativists have applied RCI concepts to the comparative study of the design of political institutions (Huber and Shipan, 2003) ; the significance of 'veto points' and 'veto players' in public policy-making (Tsebelis, 2002) ; and the delegation of powers to independent agencies and courts (Huber and Shipan, 2003) . In international relations, the RCI approach has proven a natural fit with the pre-existing rationalist research program of neoliberal institutionalism, and has informed a number of important works on topics including the rational design of international institutions (Koremenos et al., 2003) , the delegation of powers to international organizations (Pollack, 2003; Hawkins et al., 2006) , and forum-shopping among various IOs (Jupille and Snidal, 2005) . Not surprisingly, RCI has also proven to be one of the fastest-growing theories of European integration and EU politics, as we shall see presently.
[1.2] Critiques of Rational Choice Theory
Despite its rapid gains across a range of fields in political science, rational choice as an approach has been subject to extensive critique in recent years. Duncan
Snidal, in his review of rational choice approaches to IR, usefully distinguishes between 'internal critiques', which accept the basic approach but debate 'how to do rational choice' in methodological terms, and 'external critiques', which identify alleged weaknesses in the approach as a whole (Snidal, 2002: 73 Science. Unlike many critics of rational choice, these authors do not object to the core assumptions of the approach or to the use of formal models, and they applaud the scientific aspirations of most rational choice scholars. Instead, as their subtitle suggests, Green and Shapiro focus on empirical applications of rational choice models, arguing that empirical work by rational choice theorists is subject to a 'syndrome of fundamental and recurrent [methodological] failings' which call into question the contribution of the rational choice enterprise to the study of politics (Green and Shapiro, 1994: 33) . Specific weaknesses identified by the authors include the following:
• Rational choice theories are often formulated in abstract and empirically intractable ways, with heavy reliance on unobservable factors and with insufficient attention paid to the difficulties of operationalizing the hypothesized variables.
• Rational choice theorists often engage in post hoc or 'retroductive' theorizing, seeking to develop rational choice models that might plausibly explain a set of known facts or an empirical regularity. At the extreme, Green and Shapiro argue, this can become an exercise in 'curve-fitting', in which assumptions are manipulated to fit the data, but no subsequent effort is made to test the resulting model with respect to data other than those used to generate the model.
• When they move from theory to the empirical world, rational choice theorists often search for confirming evidence of their theory, engaging in 'plausibility probes' or illustrations of the theory, and selecting cases that are likely to confirm, rather than falsify, their hypotheses.
• When engaging in empirical tests (or illustrations) of their hypotheses, rational choice scholars frequently ignore alterative accounts and competing explanations for the observed outcomes, and/or test their hypotheses against trivial or implausible null hypotheses (for example, the notion that political behavior is entirely random).
• Finally, in the rare instances in which 'no plausible variant of the theory appears to work', rational choice scholars engage in 'arbitrary domain restriction', conceding the inapplicability of rational choice in a given domain, and hence arbitrarily ignoring the theory-infirming evidence from that domain (Green and Shapiro, 1994: 33-46 ).
Green and Shapiro survey rational choice applications to American politics, where they believe that much of the most sophisticated work has been done, and they find that, even here, most empirical work 'is marred by unscientifically chosen samples, poorly conducted tests, and tendentious interpretations of results ' (1994: 7) .
Green and Shapiro's critique has been subject to numerous responses from rational choice scholars, who suggest that the authors 'misunderstand the theory, overlook its achievements, or adhere to naïve methodological standards' in their indictment of rational choice (Friedman 1996: 5) . 5 For our purposes in this chapter, however, Green and Shapiro's critique serves as a useful cautionary note: While there is little dispute in EU studies that rational choice has made increasing headway into the field, it remains to be seen whether rational choice models have made a genuine contribution to our empirical understanding of EU politics, or whether empirical applications of rational choice to the EU have been subject to the methodological failings identified by Green and Shapiro.
By contrast with these internal critiques, 'external critiques' have been directed at the rational choice by both constructivists (particularly in IR theory) and psychologists (most often associated with behavioral economics), who argue that rational choice emphasizes certain problems and sets aside other issues by assumption, resulting in 'ontological blind spots' and inaccurate renderings of the empirical world. Rational choice is 'found deficient in explaining who the key actors are, in explaining their interests, explaining the origin of institutions, or explaining how these change' (Snidal, 2002: 74) . In EU studies, this external critique is most common among the growing number of constructivist scholars who argue that EU institutions shape not only the behavior but also the preferences and identities of individuals and member states in Europe (Sandholtz, 1996; Lewis, 2005) . The argument is stated most forcefully by Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jorgensen, and Antje Wiener, who argue that European integration has had a 'transformative impact' on the interests and identities of individuals, but that this transformation 'will remain largely invisible in approaches that neglect processes of identity formation and/or assume interests to be given exogenously ' (1999: 529) . Similarly, because of its focus on institutional equilibria, other critics have suggested that rational choice is blind to endogenous change, such as appears to be commonplace within the EU.
Later in this chapter, I examine how the rational choice study of EU politics has responded to these internal and external critiques. With regard to the internal critiques, I examine the empirical contribution of rational choice analyses to five discrete areas of study in EU politics, asking whether these studies have fallen prey to (Haas, 1958 (Haas, , 2001 Moravcsik, 1998) . By the same token, however, Haas's theory also focused on the possible transfer of 'loyalties' from the national to the European level, without specifying clearly the nature of such loyalties, and constructivists have subsequently come to identify their work with this strand of neofunctionalist theory (Haas, 2001; Risse, 2005) .
Intergovernmentalist theory, in turn, drew largely from the soft rational choice tradition of realist theory, identifying the EU's member governments implicitly or explicitly as rational actors who were both aware of, and capable of forestalling, the transfer of authority to supranational institutions in Brussels (Hoffmann, 1966) . By contrast with later rational choice work, however, early intergovernmentalist works seldom specified a clear set of preferences for member governments, beyond a generic concern for national sovereignty, and they typically neglected to model the strategic interaction between governments and the supranational agents they had created.
In (Moravcsik, 1998: 9) .
As noted earlier, however, the rational choice study of the European Union is most closely associated with rational choice institutionalists who have sought to The growing presence of rational choice theory in EU studies, however, raises an additional set of questions: Has rational choice been empirically fruitful, in the sense of generating testable first-order hypotheses about outcomes in EU politics?
Have these hypotheses been subjected to careful and systematic testing, free from the 'pathologies' identified by Green and Shapiro? And, if so, have rationalist hypotheses found support in rigorous empirical testing? While a complete response to such questions is beyond the scope of this chapter, the chapters in this volumeeach of which provides a thorough review of the scholarship undertaken in a particular area of EU studies -provide a useful starting point for at least a preliminary answer. Indeed, a careful reading of the chapters of this book will reveal that rational choice theory now has been applied to virtually every area of EU politics.
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that rational choice theory employs a 'positive heuristic' that directs the analyst's attention to particular types of questions, and so the contribution of rational choice has not been uniform across questions or issue-areas (Lakatos, 1970: 135) .
Reflecting the widespread importation of RCI into EU studies, rational choice applications have made the greatest headway in the study of EU institutions, and in particular in the areas of legislative, executive and judicial politics. In each of these areas, scholars have been able to draw on a series of 'off-the-shelf' theories and models, and previous reviews have focused largely on these areas (see e.g. Jupille and Caporaso 1999; Aspinwall and Schneider, eds., 2001; Dowding, 2001; Pollack, 2004; Moser et al, eds., 2004; Hix, 2005; and Scully, 2005) . As noted above, however, rational choice theories are no longer limited to the study of formal EU institutions, but have begun to be applied to other questions, such as the Europeanization of domestic politics and public opinion toward the EU, among others. In this section, I
review the empirical applications and tests of rational choice theories in each of these five areas, drawing largely from the excellent reviews of these areas in the chapters of this book. 7 By and large, as we shall see, the balance sheet in these five areas is positive: while there is some evidence that the positive heuristic of rational choice theories has directed scholars' attention to certain questions to the exclusion of others, and while some work in each of these fields has been characterized by one or another of Green and Shapiro's methodological pathologies, across the five areas rational choice theories have generated specific, testable hypotheses, and the resulting empirical work has dramatically improved our understanding of EU politics and largely (although not invariably) supported the rationalist hypotheses in question. The European Parliament (EP) has been the subject of extensive theoretical modeling and empirical study over the past two decades, with a growing number of scholars studying the legislative organization of the EP and the voting behavior of its members (MEPs), adapting models of legislative politics derived largely from the study of the US Congress. The early studies of the Parliament, in the 1980s and early 1990s, emphasized the striking fact that, in spite of the multinational nature of the Parliament, the best predictor of MEP voting behavior is not nationality but an MEP's 'party group', with the various party groups demonstrating extraordinarily high measures of cohesion in roll-call votes. These MEPs, moreover, were shown to contest elections and cast their votes in a two-dimensional 'issue space', including not only the familiar nationalism/supranationalism dimension but also and especially the more traditional, 'domestic' dimension of left-right contestation (Hix, 2001) . Still other studies have focused on the legislative organization of the EP, including not only the party groups but also the Parliament's powerful committees, whose members play an important agenda-setting role in preparing legislation for debate on the floor of Parliament (Kreppel, 2001) . Perhaps most fundamentally, these scholars have shown, the EP can increasingly be studied as a 'normal parliament' whose members vote predictably and cohesively within a political space dominated by the familiar contestation between parties of the left and right (Hix, Noury and Roland, 2002) . formulas. The use of such voting-power indexes has led to substantial debate among rational choice scholars, with several scholars criticizing the approach for its emphasis on formal voting weight at the expense of national preferences (Albert, 2003) . Whatever the merit of voting-power indexes, it is worth noting that the study of Council decision-making appears to be an area in which the use of off-the-shelf models has -at least initially -focused researchers' attention onto a relatively narrow set of questions, at the expense of other questions of equally great substantive interest.
In recent years, however, a growing number of scholars have begun to examine voting and coalition patterns in the Council, noting the puzzling lack of minimum-winning coalitions, the extensive use of unanimous voting (even where QMV is an option), and the existence of a North-South cleavage within the Council. To some observers, these debates have verged on scholasticism, focusing more on model specification than on the empirical reality of legislative decisionmaking, and coming around to empirical testing relatively late in the day (Crombez, Steunenberg and Corbett, 2000; Garrett, Tsebelis and Corbett, 2001 ). Taken as a whole, however, the debate over the EP's legislative powers, like early work on the internal organization of the Parliament, has both clarified the basic theoretical assumptions that scholars make about the various actors and their preferences, and motivated systematic empirical studies that have generated cumulative knowledge about the EU legislative process.
[3.2] Executive Politics
The study of EU executive politics, Jonas Tallberg Commission and other agents largely to reduce the transaction costs of policymaking, in particular through the monitoring of member-state compliance, the filling-in of 'incomplete contracts', and the speedy and efficient adoption of implementing regulations (Moravcsik, 1998; Pollack, 2003; Franchino, 2002 Franchino, , 2004 Franchino, , 2007 . By contrast with these positive results, however, scholars have found little or no support for the hypothesis that member states delegate powers to the Commission to take advantage of its superior expertise (Moravcsik, 1998; Pollack, 2003) .
In addition to the question of delegation, rational choice institutionalists have devoted greater attention to a second question posed by principal-agent models: What if an agent-such as the Commission, the Court of Justice, or the ECB-behaves in ways that diverge from the preferences of the principals? The answer to this question in principal-agent analysis lies primarily in the administrative procedures that the principals may establish to define ex ante the scope of agency activities, as well as the oversight procedures that allow for ex post oversight and sanctioning of errant agents.
Applied to the EU, principal-agent analysis leads to the hypothesis that agency autonomy is likely to vary across issue-areas and over time, as a function of the preferences of the member governments, the distribution of information between principals and agents, and the decision rules governing the application of sanctions or the adoption of new legislation. By and large, empirical studies of executive politics in the EU have supported these hypotheses, pointing in particular to the significance of decision rules as a crucial determinant of executive autonomy (Pollack, 1997 (Pollack, , 2003 Tallberg, 2000 Tallberg, , 2003 .
In sum, the rational choice, principal-agent approach has indeed, as Tallberg argues, come to dominate the study of the Commission and other executive actors in the past several decades. This principal-agent literature, like other rational choice approaches, can be criticized for its focus on a particular set of (albeit very important) questions about the relationship between principals and agents, and for its neglect of other equally important questions such as the internal workings of executive organizations like the Commission. Furthermore, as Simon Hix argues in his contribution to this volume, the traditional PA assumption that the Commission is an outlier with particularly intense preferences for greater integration may be misleading in the post-Maastricht era where the EU has already placed markers in nearly every area of public policy. Nevertheless, principal-agent models have provided a theoretical framework to ask a series of pointed questions about the causes and consequences of delegating executive power to EU actors, and they have directed scholars' attention to factors such as transaction costs, information asymmetries, and Garrett and Weingast (1993: 189) argued, the ECJ might identify 'constructed focal points' among multiple equilibrium outcomes, but the Court was unlikely to rule against the preferences of powerful EU member states.
Responding to Garrett's work, other scholars argued forcefully that Garrett's model overestimated the control mechanisms available to powerful member states and the ease of sanctioning an activist Court, which has been far more autonomous than Garrett suggests, and that Garrett's empirical work misread the preferences of the member governments and the politics of internal market reform. Such accounts suggest that the Court has been able to pursue the process of legal integration far beyond the collective preferences of the member governments, in part because of the high costs to member states in overruling or failing to comply with ECJ decisions, and in part because the ECJ enjoys powerful allies in the form of national courts, which refer hundreds of cases per year to the ECJ via the 'preliminary reference' procedure Slaughter, 1995, 1998; Stone Sweet and Caporaso, 1998; Stone Sweet and Brunell, 1998; Alter 2001) . In this view, best summarized by Stone Sweet and Caporaso (1998: 129) , 'the move to supremacy and direct effect must be understood as audacious acts of agency' by the Court. Responding to these critiques, rational choice analyses of the ECJ have become more nuanced over time, acknowledging the limits of member-state control over the court and testing hypotheses about the conditions under which the ECJ enjoys the greatest autonomy from its national masters (Garrett, 1995; Garrett, Kelemen and Schulz, 1998; Kilroy, 1999; Pollack, 2003) .
More recently, as Conant points out, the literature on the ECJ and legal integration has increasingly moved from the traditional question of the ECJ's relationship with national governments, toward the study of the ECJ's other interlocutors, including most notably the national courts that bring the majority of cases before the ECJ, and the individual litigants who use EU law to achieve their aims within national legal systems. Such studies have problematized and sought to explain the complex and ambivalent relationship between the ECJ and national courts, as well as the varying litigation strategies of 'one-shot' litigants and 'repeat players' before the courts (Mattli and Slaughter, 1998; Alter, 2001; Conant, 2002) . These and other studies, influenced largely (although not exclusively) by rational choice models, have demonstrated the complexities of ECJ legal integration, the interrelationships among supranational, national and subnational political and legal actors, and the limits of EU law in national legal contexts. The explicit derivation and testing of competing rationalist and constructivist hypotheses, moreover, has not been limited to the study of Europeanization in the 'old' member states, but has turned since the late 1990s in a concerted fashion to the impacts of the EU on the candidate and new member countries of southern and eastern Europe. Students of EU enlargement had for some time framed many of their research questions in terms of the rationalist-constructivist debate, including a number of studies that grappled with the EU's decision to enlarge and the substantive terms of enlargement negotiated with the candidate countries (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002) . Toward the end of the 1990s and into the current decade, many of these scholars turned to studying the effects of the EU on candidate and new member countries.
In (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005b: 210-11) . Other recent studies employ varying theoretical frameworks and focus on different aspects of the Europeanization process, but here too the general finding is that explicit and credible political conditionality is the most important source of EU leverage and policy change in the new and candidate countries, with socialization and lesson-drawing having a much weaker and more variable impact (Jacoby, 2004; Kelley, 2004; Vachudova, 2005; Schimmelfennig, 2005; Zürn and Checkel, 2005) .
In sum, the growing literatures on Europeanization and enlargement are striking for two features, both of which augur well for the field. First, scholars have generally adopted a pragmatic, 'tool-kit' approach to rational choice and constructivist theories, deriving distinctive causal mechanisms and scope conditions for Europeanization from each theory and testing them with care and precision.
Second, in these studies, external incentives in the form of political conditionality have emerged as the best predictor of policy change in old as well as new member states, and the scope conditions associated with rational choice theory have performed well in explaining variation across both issue-areas and countries.
[3.5] Public Opinion and European Integration
The scholarly literature on EU public opinion, analyzed in this volume by Leonard Ray, was relatively late to develop, due in large part to the emphasis by early integration theorists on elite attitudes, with mass opinion frequently depicted as a 'permissive consensus' within which elites could pursue integrative schemes (Haas, 1958; Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970 The rational-choice approach to EU public opinion, which Ray associates with the study of utilitarian support, has itself been theoretically and methodologically diverse, with various scholars identifying different independent variables as determinants of public support, and operationalizing both dependent and independent variables in different ways using various survey questions from Eurobarometer and other data sources. Some utilitarian models, for example, have focused on EU fiscal transfers or on objective economic conditions at the national level as predictors of support, while others have identified the objective socioeconomic characteristics of individuals, or else subjective individual evaluations of economic costs and benefits, as the best measures of utilitarian support. There is, in other words, no single 'rational choice theory' of EU public opinion, but a huge variety of first-order theories and hypotheses, each of which has been subjected to empirical testing, typically using quantitative analyses of Eurobarometer survey data. The complex, and sometimes inconclusive, empirical findings of this literature are summarized by
Leonard, who notes that the most robust findings point to the importance of socioeconomic status ('human capital') and subjective economic perceptions as predictors of support for European integration. The impact of such utilitarian factors is not uncontested, with some studies arguing that identity is at least as strong a predictor of public opinion toward the EU as economic interest (Hooghe and Marks, 2004) , but the central place of rational-choice or utilitarian models in the literature is clear.
Perhaps the most striking feature of the public opinion literature for our purposes is its close approximation of Green and Shapiro's (1994) ideal type of social-scientific research. Unlike some other, more theoretically driven areas of EU research, work on EU public opinion has indeed been problem-driven and theoretically eclectic, with even strongly rationalist scholars like Matthew Gabel (1998) testing affective and other sources of support alongside utilitarian hypotheses.
Furthermore, while one can question the operationalization of variables or the selection of data in any individual study, the public opinion literature as a whole has steered well clear of Green and Shapiro's methodological pathologies, relying as it has on multivariate statistical testing of competing hypotheses drawn from distinct theoretical approaches. discretion vis-à-vis the member governments; individuals do appear to base their opinions of the EU in large part on a calculation of expected utility; and member and candidate countries do appear to respond most consistently to material incentives provided by the EU. While the debates in all these areas remain ongoing, the best rational choice work of the past decade has been empirically as well as theoretically rigorous and fruitful, and has advanced our understanding of EU politics from the Brussels institutions to the member governments to individual opinions and behavior.
[4] Challenges for Rationalist Analysis of the EU
Still, the reader may ask, what do rational choice approaches leave out or ignore in their study of EU politics? In addition to the 'internal' critique of poor empirical work, rational choice has also been subject to an 'external' critique, which emphasizes its limited domain of application and its 'ontological blindness' to important questions. Indeed, even within the five issues examined above, we noticed a tendency for rational choice approaches to focus, at least initially, on questions that are most amenable to study using off-the-shelf models while paying less attention to other equally important questions. Looking beyond our five selected issues, the external critique from constructivism raises three interrelated issues that I examine, very briefly, in this section. I consider first whether the purported 'great debate' between rationalism and constructivism has been a metatheoretical dialogue of the deaf or a useful controversy, and I then go on to consider the ability of rational choice approaches to theorize about endogenous preference formation and endogenous sources of change, respectively.
[4.1] Rationalism vs. Constructivism: A Useful Controversy
Within both international relations and EU studies, the past decade has witnessed a marked change in the presentation of the field. By the late 1990s, and into the early 2000s, it was commonplace for scholars to depict both IR and EU studies as being characterized by a new 'great debate' between rational choice and constructivism, displacing earlier debates such as that between neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism (Katzenstein et al., 1998; Christiansen et al., 1999; Moravcsik, 1999; Checkel and Moravcsik, 2001) .
By the start of the current decade, however, a number of scholars noted the drawbacks of engaging in a grand meta-theoretical debate between rationalism and constructivism in both IR theory and EU studies. In an influential essay, James
Fearon and Alexander Wendt focused on the potential pitfalls of organizing the field of international relations around an ontological or empirical debate between rationalism and constructivism writ large. Such an approach, they argue, 'can encourage scholars to be method-driven rather than problem driven in their research', leading scholars to ignore important questions or answers that do not fit easily into the grand debate (Wendt and Fearon, 2002: 52) . In place of such a debate, the authors suggest that scholars approach rational choice and constructivist approaches pragmatically, as analytical 'tool-kits' that 'ask somewhat different questions and so bring different aspects of social life into focus ' (2002: 53) . The study of international politics may indeed be characterized by the existence of two second-order theories, but scholars' empirical work need not -and indeed should not -be organized purely in terms of a zero-sum battle among competing paradigms. Rather, the authors suggest, scholars can and should engage in problem-driven research, drawing on firstorder theories from either or both approaches as appropriate.
Within EU studies, scholars have similarly warned against a metatheoretical dialogue of the deaf, seeking instead to encourage dialogue between the two approaches, and focusing debate on first-order questions that can be resolved through careful empirical work. Moravcsik (1999) , for example, rejects the call for 'more metatheory', calling instead for theorists to articulate 'distinct falsifiable hypotheses'
and to test these hypotheses against competing theories from other approaches.
Along similar lines, three EU scholars (Jupille, Caporaso, and Checkel 2003) have recently put forward a framework for promoting integration of -or at least a fruitful dialogue between -rationalist and constructivist approaches to international relations. Rationalism and constructivism, the authors argue, are not hopelessly incommensurate, but can engage each other through 'four distinct modes of theoretical conversation', namely:
(1) competitive testing, in which competing theories are pitted against each other in explaining a single event or class of events;
(2) a 'domain of application' approach, in which each theory is considered to explain some sub-set of empirical reality;
(3) a 'sequencing' approach, in which one theory might explain a particular step in a sequence of actions (e.g., a constructivist explanation of national preferences) while another theory might best explain subsequent developments (e.g., a rationalist explanation of subsequent bargaining); and (4) 'incorporation' or 'subsumption', in which one theory claims to subsume the other.
Looking at the substantive empirical work in their special issue, Jupille, Caporaso and
Checkel find that most contributions to the rationalist/constructivist debate utilize competitive testing, while only a small number have adopted domain of application, sequencing, or subsumption approaches. Nevertheless, they see substantial progress in the debate, in which both sides generally accept a common standard of empirical testing as the criterion for useful theorizing about EU politics.
Similarly, the review of empirical applications in EU studies conducted above suggests that the rationalist/constructivist debate has not been a dialogue of the deaf but a 'useful controversy', forcing scholars on both sides to articulate clear assumptions, test their hypotheses against competing explanations, and specify alternative causal mechanisms for phenomena like Europeanization. In addition, the rationalist-constructivist debate has pressed rational-choice theorists to address two vital issues that have been at the margins of the approach: endogenous preference formation and change.
[4.2] Endogenous Preference Formation
One of the central bones of contention between rationalists and constructivists -both generally and in EU studies -has been the issue of endogenous preference formation. To some extent, this debate has been muddied from the outset by a lack of clarity about the meanings of the terms 'exogenous' and 'endogenous'. For many theorists, exogeneity and endogeneity are characteristics of theories -what they seek
to explain and what they leave unexplained. In this view, to say that actor preferences are 'exogenously given' means that the theorist makes no attempt to explain preferences, but simply adopts assumptions about them in order to theorize and make predictions about some other dependent variable or explanandum, such as actor behavior or policy outcomes. By contrast, other theories 'endogenize' actor preferences, in the precise sense of making those preferences the explanandum or dependent variable of the study. Rational choice theorists are typically seen to take the first approach, adopting simplifying assumptions about actor preferences (and hence making them exogenous to the theory, which makes no effort to explain them), whereas constructivists tend to place actors' identities and interests at the center of the analysis and attempt to explain them, frequently with regard to the social contexts that actors inhabit (Fearon and Wendt, 2002: 60) .
Muddying the waters, however, a slightly different interpretation of exogeneity and endogeneity has arisen in the debate between rational choice institutionalists and constructivists in IR and EU studies. In these institutionalist accounts, a number of constructivist authors have argued that the preferences of various national actors are endogenous to the international institution in question, e.g.
that actor preferences are shaped (at least in part) by interaction and socialization at the international level (e.g. Sandholtz, 1996; , Lewis, 2005 . By contrast, scholars who believe that national preferences are formulated domestically and are unaltered by interaction at the international level are often depicted as claiming that national preferences are exogenous to international institutions.
This distinction -between preferences being exogenous or endogenous to a theory, as opposed to being exogenous or endogenous to an international institutionmatters in assessing the purported 'ontological blindness' of rationalism to this question. If we take the first approach, urged on us by Fearon and Wendt (2002: 60) , the question is whether rational choice theories are clearly capable of 'endogenizing'
-of seeking to explain -preferences, including the 'national preferences' of states in the international system. If it could be shown that rational choice is truly incapable of theorizing national preferences as an explanandum, then we might argue that the correct relationship between the two approaches may be 'domain of application' or 'sequencing' relationship, in which constructivists focus on explaining preferences and rationalists limit their efforts to modeling interactions among actors with exogenously given preferences.
Such a neat division of labor, however, does not stand up to careful scrutiny.
Rational choice theorists have not abandoned the effort to explain actor preferences, particularly in international relations and in EU studies, where national preference formation has been a significant object of study for rationalists as well as constructivists. Within EU studies, for example, Andrew Moravcsik's liberal theory of national preference formation seeks to explain national preferences through the aggregation of individual and producer preferences by national governments, and clearly endogenizes national preference formation in this sense (Moravcsik, 1998) .
More broadly, rational choice theorists in IR have theorized explicitly and in a variety of ways about the endogenous formation of national preferences, including a range of models that focus on political and economic coalitions, principal-agent relations, audience costs, and the effects of regime types and institutional rules on the aggregation of individual preferences at the national level (Snidal, 2002: 84-5) . By and large, such accounts retain simplifying assumptions about individual preferences, focusing instead on the creation of testable hypotheses about the impact of factors such as economic change and domestic institutions on the aggregation of individual preferences into national preferences. Evolutionary game theorists go even further, seeking to explain individual preference formation through mechanisms of complex learning and selection (Gerber and Jackson, 1993; Fearon and Wendt, 2002: 65) .
Clearly, then, rational choice theory is not blind to the question of endogenous preference formation, nor have rationalists been unproductive in formulating and testing first-order theories about it.
Hence, when rationalists in EU studies and international relations are charged with blindness toward endogenous preference formation, it is typically in the second and more narrow sense, i.e., that rationalists are unable to theorize about the purported socializing impact of international/EU institutions on states (or on their representatives). Here, critics of rational choice are on firmer ground: Moravscik's liberal intergovernmentalism, the most prominent rationalist theory to problematize and explain national preferences, does indeed rule out any socializing impact of international interaction on national preferences, in favor of a purely domestic process of preference formation (Moravcsik, 1998) . Even here, however, rational choice theory is not entirely irrelevant to the study of socialization in EU institutions, and indeed a recent special issue of International Organization usefully formulates and tests three distinct mechanisms of socialization drawn from rational choice theory ('strategic calculation'), sociological institutionalism ('role playing'), and
Habermasian communicative rationality ('normative suasion') (Checkel, ed., 2005) .
The contributors to the volume take a problem-driven approach, drawing appears to lie outside the core assumptions of the rational choice approach. 'While… the ontological differences separating rationalism and constructivism are often overstated', he argues, 'the former is nonetheless ill-equipped to theorize those instances in which the basic properties of agents are changing' (Checkel 2005: 810) .
On the other hand, despite these limitations, several of the volume's authors argue that rational choice theory is capable of theorizing important elements of the socialization process, and that the empirical findings of the project are in each case subject to a 'double-interpretation', in which empirical outcomes can be construed as consistent with a rational choice as well as a constructivist explanation (Zürn and Checkel, 2005; Johnston, 2005) . Several of the studies in the volume, for example, point to the central importance of material incentives, which emerge as a stronger predictor of sustained compliance than socialization without such incentives, and a general finding of the project is that the researchers did not 'see as much socialization as expected' -findings clearly consistent with even a thick rational choice perspective (Zürn and Checkel, 2005: 1068; see also Kelley, 2004; Schimmelfennig, 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005b) . Furthermore, they argue, even findings that appear at first glance to be clearly in support of the constructivist approach, such as the emergence of a culture of compromise with the EU's Committee of Permanent Representatives, can be plausibly interpreted in thin-rationalist terms as instances of political delegation, diffuse reciprocity, or simple learning (Zürn and Checkel, 2005: 1056-65) . For all of these reasons, Zürn and Checkel echo Fearon and Wendt (2002) in advocating a pragmatic approach to the rationalist/constructivist divide, in which overlaps are acknowledged and differences highlighted through a careful dialogue among first-and second-order theories of international politics.
In sum, rational choice theory is certainly capable of theorizing endogenous preference formation, particularly insofar as national preferences are derived from the aggregation of domestic preferences through domestic political institutions; and even the study of international socialization can benefit from the articulation of a discrete set of rationalist hypotheses which may fall short of predicting changes in the core preferences of actors, but nevertheless provide compelling explanations for a wide range of related empirical phenomena.
[4.3] Theorizing Change
A final weakness of rational choice analysis is its purported to inability theorize change -or more precisely, to theorize 'endogenous' change. Here again,
we encounter some diversity in the use of the terms exogenous and endogenous. If we take Fearon and Wendt's (2002) definition, invoked above, then a theory that endogenizes change is one that seeks to theorize about and explain the sources of change, whereas a theory that exogenizes change is one that takes the source of change -say, the rise of a new great power, or a change in relative prices on world markets -as an assumption, and seeks to examine the effects of that source on an existing equilibrium. The key difference, again, is whether the source of change is taken as an unexplained independent variable (hence, exogenous), or is explained in some way by the theory (endogenous).
Within institutionalist theory, by contrast, the terms endogenous and exogenous have taken on a distinct, if overlapping, meaning. In this view, carefully articulated by Laurence Helfer, exogeneity and endogeneity are defined in reference to the institution or organization being studied. In this view, widely shared by institutionalist IR scholars, 'change emanating from IO officials and staff is properly labeled as "endogenous" whereas that change resulting from shifts in state preferences or from alterations to the economic, political or social environment is appropriately described as "exogenous"' (Helfer 2006: 4) .
Regardless of which of these definitions we accept, it has become commonplace to suggest that rational choice theories, with their emphasis on stable equilibria from which no actor has an incentive to depart, place a theoretical emphasis on stability rather than on change. Indeed, if the definition of an institutional equilibrium is that 'no one has an incentive to deviate from the behavior associated with the institution', then by definition 'any changes in self-enforcing institutions must have an extraneous origin' (Greif and Laitin, 2004: 633) . Thus, to the extent that rational choice models do address change, such change is typically attributed to exogenous shocks that (temporarily) upset an equilibrium and lead (eventually) to a new equilibrium (Helfer 2006: 4) .
Looking specifically to EU studies, it appears that even the best rational choice work shares this tendency to either neglect the issue of change or to attribute change to exogenous shocks. Moravcsik's The Choice for Europe, for example, problematizes both national preferences and institutional change, but his analysis traces the primary sources of change to exogenous developments in the global economy (Moravcsik, 1998) . Similarly, Carrubba and Volden's (2001) formal model of change in Council voting rules, while also addressing directly the issue of change, attributes those changes to exogenous (unexplained) changes in the number of member states, changes in legislative procedures, and changes in policy areas under consideration, each of which can affect the Council's ability to pass legislation and thus provide member states with a rational incentive to consider changes to the Council's voting rules and weights. These works, unlike much rational choice work on the EU, do theorize a process of change, but the sources of change remain exogenous -both to the institutions of the Union and more broadly to the theories being advanced. Given the rapid pace of institutional and policy change in the European Union over the past several decade, this relative inattention to endogenous sources of change -which has long been the bread-and-butter of neofunctionalist theory -seems a surprising lacuna.
As a variant on RCI, historical institutionalism seems a more promising approach to studying change within institutions like the EU. By contrast with rational choice's focus on stable equilibria, historical institutionalism has focused on the effects of institutions over time, and in particular at the ways in which a given set of (North, 1990; Pierson, 2000 Pierson, , 2004 .
Historical institutionalism have been widely applied to the study of the European Union over the past two decades, with a particular emphasis on the pathdependent development of the EU and its policies. Fritz Scharpf's (1988) feedbacks that stabilize and reinforce existing equilibria, but also negative feedbacks that create pressures for institutional and policy change. Such feedbacks, it is argued, can produce changes that are gradual in timing but ultimately transformative in effect (Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Hall and Thelen, 2006; Immergut, 2006) . Welfare-state programs, for example, may be structured such that the value of benefits erodes over time, and this benefit erosion in turn may lead to a decline in public support for those programs -a clear negative feedback in an issue-area long characterized by the predominance of positive feedbacks (Immergut, 2006) .
Within rational choice, the most concerted effort to theorize endogenous sources of institutional change has come from Avner Greif and David Laitin, who offer a model of endogenous change that draws upon game-theoretic equilibrium models but introduces a dynamic theory of institutional change (Greif and Laitin, 2004) . In a standard game-theoretic model, the authors suggest, institutions and their associated behaviors are endogenized (explained), while the environmental context for any given institution (say, a given level of technology, or the global economy, or the global balance of power) is theorized as an exogenous set of 'parameters' that help to define the equilibrium outcome within that institution. In this context, however, it is possible that the workings of an institution can in turn affect the value of its parameters -or what Greif and Laitin call 'quasi-parameters' -which in turn may affect the internal equilibrium of the institution, either reinforcing it or undermining it. Self-reinforcing institutions, in this view, are those that change the quasi-parameters of the institution so as to make the institution, and the individual behaviors of the actors within it, more stable in the face of exogenous changes. Selfundermining institutions, by contrast, are those that change the quasi-parameters such that a previously stable equilibrium is undermined; these institutions, in Greif and Laitin's terms, 'can cultivate the seeds of their own demise ' (2004: 34) . Further developing Greif and Laitin's ideas, Tim Büthe has suggested that the actions of the EU's supranational agents can similarly be theorized as an endogenous source of change, either reinforcing or undermining the Union's institutional and policy equilibrium over the long term (Büthe, 2006 (Haas, 1958) , gaps in member-state control (Pierson, 1996; Pollack, 2003) , long-term socialization of elites (Haas, 1958; and the negotiation of informal agreements that are subsequently codified over time (Farrell and Héritier, 2005) . The notion that EU institutions might have negative or self-undermining feedbacks has been explored less systematically 9 , yet the Union's ongoing constitutional crisis and the long-term decline in public support for further integration suggest that negative feedbacks should be the focus of greater attention in future studies of institutional change.
At the same time, however, both rational choice and other scholars should beware of the temptation to 'endogenize' all sources of change within a single theory, or to attribute all change within the European Union to positive or negative feedback effects from the EU itself. As Ellen Immergut aptly observes, 'Although exogenous change sounds like a fancy word for an ad hoc explanation, there are many interesting and systematic exogenous sources of change' (Immergut, 2006: 6) . Indeed, while scholars should be attentive to possible feedback effects from European integration, it is both possible and likely that 'exogenous' factors, including political and economic changes on the world stage or critical elections within one or more member countries, have served and may continue to serve as the most important sources of change in the EU, and that the feedback effects of European integration may be rare or weak compared with other domestic and/or global sources of change.
[5] Conclusions
There is an old expression to the effect that when you have a hammer, every problem looks like a nail. Critics of rational choice in EU studies have often argued that formal modelers in particular have approached the EU almost exclusively through the lens of their off-the-shelf theories, asking only narrow questions about those aspects of the EU that resemble, say, domestic legislatures or principal-agent relationships. There is, I have argued in this chapter, some truth to this claim: rational choice theorists have followed a positive heuristic that has pointed them toward the study of strategic interaction within institutional constraints, and away from other questions such as socialization, deliberation, and identity change.
Nevertheless, the picture presented in this chapter is broadly speaking a positive one, with respect to both rational choice analysis and the field of EU studies as a whole. With regard to the former, we have seen how, over the past several decades, students of the EU have adapted rational choice theories of politics with increasing sophistication to the myriad of specific questions we can ask about European integration and EU politics. Moreover, I have argued, the empirical record of these theories has been, on balance, positive and productive, not pathological.
While we do find some evidence of elaborate models subjected to cursory testing (or no testing at all), the broader picture is one in which scholars draw on rational choice theories (and other theories) to generate testable hypotheses about concrete political outcomes across a range of subject areas. Even in areas that have been considered to be outside the domain of application of rational choice, such as endogenous preference formation and change, rational choice theories have (alongside constructivists) contributed to the development of a sophisticated research program on EU socialization, as well as pioneering (alongside historical institutionalists) a revitalized discussion on the endogenous sources of change in the EU. Much remains to be done in these areas, and the work reviewed here is in many cases suggestive rather than conclusive, but the claim that rational choice is 'ontologically blind' to such questions has not been borne out.
With regard to the health of the field overall, it is striking that the rational choice/constructivist divide in EU studies, which many scholars feared would descend into a metatheoretical dialogue of the deaf, has instead proven healthy to the field and to rationalist and constructivist theorists on both sides of the divide. To a very large extent, students of EU politics have taken a pragmatic and problem-driven approach:
identifying an important problem, searching the existing literature (both rationalist and constructivist) for relevant insights and hypotheses, and seeking to test those hypotheses through careful empirical analysis. This is the approach taken in much of the literature on public opinion, Europeanization, Eastern enlargement and socialization, and the same approach should be applicable to the full range of research questions in EU studies.
The case for rational choice, finally, can be made more forcefully. Thoughtful rational choice theorists over the past decade have argued that rational choice models should be most powerful within a certain domain, in which the stakes of individual decision are considerable (making the calculation of expected utility worthwhile), the informational context is relatively rich (making calculation of expected utility possible), and the rules of the game are clearly and formally spelled out (Fiorina, 1996; Ferejohn and Satz, 1996) . The European Union, whether we call it an international regime or a polity-in-the-making, has all of these characteristics, suggesting that EU politics is a promising forum for the elaboration and testing of rational choice theories even beyond the core areas explored in this chapter (Jupille, 2004; Hix, 2005) . Put differently, across the full range of its activities, EU politics does indeed look like a nail -and we as a discipline would do well to get some hammers.
an earlier draft of this chapter. 2 Rational choice, as Jon Elster (1986) notes, is both a normative and a positive theory. In normative terms, rational choice theory does not dictate the ends or aims to which individuals should strive, but it does 'tell us what we ought to do in order to achieve our aims as well as possible'. By contrast, rational choice as a positive theory adopts a particular set of assumptions about actors and about their social context, and seeks to generate testable hypotheses about human behavior. Despite the significance of the normative aspect, I focus here on rational choice exclusively as a positive theory, inquiring whether rational choice theories have advanced our understanding of EU politics. 3 This is, of course, a severely compressed discussion of a theoretical approach whose basic tenets remain to some extent contested. For good discussions see e.g. Elster 1986; Fearon, 1991; and Snidal, 2001 . 4 The use of such models has been controversial, with critics accusing modelers of simply restating in simplified form basic insights already familiar to substantive experts in the field. However, as Snidal (2002: 77-78) has argued, formal models of collective action and international cooperation have produced non-intuitive or counter-intuitive findings that went largely against dominant views and generated specific predictions about both the obstacles and the solutions to collective action problems. For good discussions on the role of formal models in EU studies, see e.g. Hug, 2003; Pahre, 2005. 5 For a useful collection of responses to Green and Shapiro's critique, see e.g. the essays collected in Friedman, ed., 1996. 6 Foundational works in the RCI canon include Scharpf, 1988; Garrett, 1992; Tsebelis, 1994; and Garrett and Tsebelis, 1996 . For useful reviews of institutionalism in EU studies, see e.g. Jupille and Caporaso 1999; Dowding 2000; Aspinwall and Schneider 2001; and Pollack 2004. 7 I am grateful to Andrew Moravcsik for suggesting the empirical fruitfulness of rational choice theory as a central focus of this chapter.
